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PATIENT SUFFERING AND THE ANOINTING 
OFTHESICK 
A physician. reflecting on the early days of his 
medical training. recounts a relationship with a patient 
suffering from a rare form of bone cancer. He recalls the 
following: 
In the hospital. it was the habit [of this patient] to roam the 
han, late at night after his wife and small children had gone to 
their lodging. I never asked him whether;t was pain that kept him 
moving or perhaps loneliness and a simple desire for 
conversation. One night, having completed my work fOT the day, 
feeling too tired to read on my own, and facing no other prospect 
buttogive in to sleep, I felt like talking. 
On that night, and on other nights following, we discussed 
nothing in particular. Our conversation might turn to his 
aspirations at work. ... ar La my thoughts about medicine. For a time 
he would lalk about his plans for the future as though they were 
Jilll foremost in his mind. but before long he would lapse in to the 
past tense and grow sullen. I think that a part of him was looking 
for encouragement. but whatlitt.1e I knew of his condition made 
medical reassurance nearly impOSSible. I hid from his pain by 
focu'ing on the bright side of things. It was a kind of dishonesty, 
though at that early point in my medical training I did not 
recognize it as such. 'What we had was better than silence, but we 
r.Ncr really talked. 
One night. after I had been away for several days, I met him 
19;tin in the semidark hallway ncar the nurses' station. He was 
asking a nurse to bring something to his room ... For some reason, 
she proceeded to introduce the two of us - a rare event by 
hospital standards. Equally strange. neither he nor I spoke up to 
g,y that we aJeady knew one another. I put out my hand to shake 
his, and he stancd to do the same; then it hit me: his arm was 
Illissing, It had been amputated as part of his treatmenL I should 
hive anticipated the amputation ... but it came as a surprisc to me. 
In the inSlant before my hand withdrew and I looked down, at a 
loss for what to say or do, ] caught in his eyes a look of sorrow, 
perhaps even shame. I begged his pardon, but we did not speak 
further ... We never met again. (Gunderman 1!>-16) 
II. nlerese Lysaught, when she has completed her dissertation at 
DuM this spring. willla"" up a position as an Associate for Social 
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A week or so later. the patient dies. and the rapidity 
of the deterioration and the injustice of the illness creates a 
crisis for the physician. He feels that he has failed this 
patient. though not medically as this was not his patient. 
He senses that he has failed morally, although according to 
the principles and canons of biomedical ethics. he has 
done nothing ·wrong.' The physician is disturbed that 
nothing in his medical training or in his medical ethics 
prepared him. guided him. instructed him in how to attend 
to this man's pain and suffering. . 
As it did whh this physician, sutT~ring confronts us. 
compels us, and condemns us. It confronts us with shock 
that can upheave our unified, positive, progressive vision of 
our world, our lives, and our selves. It compels us to act-
to alleviate it or to flee from it-in order to 'restore our 
sense of unity shattered by its eruption into our present. It 
condemns us-our fictions of uni 1y, peace and 
invulnerability. our factual selfcentered"ess and complicity 
in its creation and sustenance, our paralysis in its face -and 
our evasion of responsibility. 
Suffering similarly confronts theological theory. 
accusing it of being ephemeral and inadequate. assuming ~ 
the role of a problematic. a contradiction. a paradox. It 
compels us to speak words that comfort and justify. It 
condemns all theorizing that posits a metastructure more , 
important than the real and everyday or that posits a Go'd 
who could cause or allow suffering. convicting it of 
complicity and generativity of conditions, of privileging an 
air-tight image of God that we have created over the chaos 
of those who suffer. 
SutTering similarly convicts biomedical ethical theory. " 
In confronting biomedical ethics, the physical and social 
suffering of patients rarely finds itself addressed 
adequately_ The reality of this suffering condemns a 
biomedical ethics that privileges the construction of clean 
and clear formulaic principles aimed primarily at 
facilitating the decision-making of medical practitioners 
and that allies itself with a theoretical structure which 
cannot account for the suffering of patients - a suffering ," 
which is the raison d 'elre for medicine and the locus for 
much of the moral significance of medicine. As for this 
15 
physician, the suITerings of patients compel us to look 
beyond biomedical ethics. 
This essay, then, undertakes three tas~s. Part ?ne 
offers a construction of some of the pllliosophlcal 
commitments of biomedical ethics, arguing that these 
prevent it from adequately conceptualizing two crucial 
characteristics of patients: (I) the fact that they are 
suITering and (2) religious/moral interpretations patients 
give to their own suffering. In order to highlight this 
problem, part two describes some of the dynamics of 
suffering as drawn from narratives of patients and 
phenomenological analyses of suITering. Finally, part three 
reflects on one way in which the Christian tradition has 
incorporated these dimensions of sickness and suITering 
into its corporate life, namely the Rite of the Anointing of 
the Sick. 
BJOMFlllCAL ETIIlCS ANn ITS n!EORETICAL ALLIANcES 
Biomedical ethics failed this physician, failed to give 
him the conceptual or moral tools with which to act or to 
understand his lack of actions. It failed to convict his 
actions as wrong, although he profoundly knew that he had 
behaved badly. \\~Iat do we mean by 'biomedical ethics' in 
this context, and why do they often fail to provide the 
ncce~sa'i' guidance or illumination? 
Oiomedical elhics might profitably be understood as a 
jdj~c 'oursc' in the Foucauldian sense. Arthur Frank defines 
discourses as ·cognitive mappings of the body's possibilities 
a.nd limitations, which bodies experience as already there 
for their seU undcrslanding ... These mappings form the 
normalive parameters of how the body can understand 
itself" (Frank 48). By situating themselves at the 
intc~,cction of a number of discourses offered by societies, 
indil,duals formulatc what Frank calls a 'code' by which we 
understand, and hence navigate, both the world and our 
id~nlilics. Biomedical ethics, then, insofar as it offen 
,;;cietal expectations of normative ideals of individual 
performailce, might be understood to function in part as 
an agent of social regulation. 
> This might seem a strange categorization for those of 
us familiar with a biomedical ethic that speaks the language 
cir,principlcs, rights, autonomy, and decision-making. But 
, the power of this description is evident in H. Tristram 
,.Engelhardt's Foundations of Bioe/hies. Engelhardt is the most 
articulate and forthright spokesperson for Ihe majority 
p;,siiion in biomedical ethics, namely 'pluralist biomedical 
etl;ics.'1 Pluralist biomedical ethics sec themselves as a 
~s~~c;al attempt at secular ethics, n d~rivcd from the '"'logic 
of pluralism, • a logic which seeks to describe a neutral 
framework for the peaceable resolution of con troversies. 
(Engelhardt 6, II, 39) 
"'!:,t:t} To create this framework, pluralist biomedical ethics 
utilize normative anthropological and sociological dualisms 
th~ t structure of the liberal philosophy of pluralist society. 
The taken for granted dichotomies of mind/body, 
'reason/desire, public/private, lead Engelhardt to make 




some bold claims. First of all, he posits the morallandscap< 
as bifurcated into "two tiers" mirroring tradition.1 
distinctions between public and private. These "\Wo tie~' 
of the moral life he names the "peaceable secular 
community" and ·particular moral communities' (54). The 
"peaceable secular community" functions as a conceptual 
space in which public disputes are resolved by 'rational' 
(i.e.,impartial, unprejudiced, anyonymous, universal) 
arguments made by rational beings "anywhere in the 
cosmos" who have transcended the boundaries of th.ir 
particular communities (10,81, 105); ethical reasoning 
and moraljudgments derive authority through correlatiom 
with procedures of this general standpoint and not from 
any particular content. 
\W,i!C the second tier, particular moral communiti~ 
is the locus of moral content and meaning, thm 
communities rely on premises that, because of their 
particularity, "cannot be secured by [rational) argumen\' 
so that judgmen ts of these communities cannot b. 
validated as "rationally" autllOritative (54). Particularities 
and affectivities, commitments nurtured within particular 
moral communities, which for our purposes mean! 
especially religious commitments and convictions, th,refore, 
cannot be admitted as premises in rational ~or~1 
arguments. While moral agents live Iheir lives wlthrn 
particular, substantial, concrete communities, for moral 
purposes they must disembed themselves from these 
attachments if they wish to function in the public, mo"} 
domain. 
Engelhardt also provides criteria for membership in 
the 'peaceable secular community,' criteria lhalare 
necessary insofar as "not all humans are equal... [as he sa),J 
persons not humans are special" (104). The criter"i 
namely, rationality, self-consciousn ess, and a sense 0 
worthiness of blame and praise, define a being as an 
autonomous moral agent. A body-a human body-d~s 
not qualify one to be a moral agent; correlatively, bod~eI 
are not theoretically required for moral agency. Bod'" 
tend to be practical correlatives of moral agents, but they 
have no moral or rational value or content. , 
This distinction between 'persons' and 'human~ 
greatly simplifies the task of biomedical ethics. Engelhar I 
h· h t resoll'< argues that there are only two methods by w IC 0 
• < Th' 
an ethIcal controversy: agreed-to procedures or loree. 
autonomy of the members of the 'peaceable secular 
community' constrains society and other persons from 
using 'unconsentcd-to' force against them. But Inon; 
persons,' who can make no claim to autonomy, are no 
protected from such force. 
Thus, a contradiction becomes apparent. On th~ on.' 
hand, a primary object of pluralist biomedical ethiCS I; 
'bodies' and the task is to authorize leui timate use off or' 
, 0-. ( be 
against bodies-for example, who decides what IS a do 
done with a particular (now incompetent) body; when b I 
we stop sustaining a body; when do we let new-born U 































body will have access to health care? But this same human 
body does not count as a legitimate epistemological Of 
even anthropological moral resource. Moral subjectivity is 
equated with rational mind, and 'knowledge' is available 
only of those things predicated as accessible to all minds; 
human embodiment, the locus of human illness and 
suffering and the site of the practice of medicine, are 
overlooked.2 
THE SUFFERINGS OF PATIENTS 
The patient's suffering and pain convict the 
physician of moral failing.3 If biomedical ethics were to 
attend to the embodied sufferings of patients, what might 
they discover? 
If nothing else, they would discover that the 
sufferings of the sick differ widely. This fact alone renders 
suffering inaccessible to biomedical ethics (See Smith 261). 
Not only are different kinds of sufferings associated with 
different kinds of ilInesses--emergency traumatic injury vs. 
chronic illness vs. terminal illness that moves rapidly vs. a 
life·threatening condition that persists for twenty years vs. 
illness thathas intense social stigmas--but each individual 
body will be inscribed differently by the intersection of the 
cultural discourses of class, race, gender, agc, religion, 
science and politics with the individual's personal history. 
The matrix comprised of these intersections of discourses, 
relationships, and histories, provides our ongoing identity, 
the code by which each individual deciphers and 
negotiates the world. In instances of suffering, this 'code' is 
broken. 
In spite of this irreducible particularity, 
phenomenological and autobiographical accounts of 
suffering note three consistent dynamics. In the first 
dynamic, experiences of illness or pain often re .. situate 
palien ts' vis-a-vis their bodies, re-ordering taken-for-
granted relationships between "self" and "body." 
Experiences of illness serve as a reminder that "selves" 
depend on the integrity of bodies, that health and lives are 
radically contingent. In illness the body often moves from 
the background to the forefront of perception, and 
patients increasingly identify their selves with their bodies, 
a move which also unfortunately often encourages medical 
professionals (0 do the same. Some describe this aspect of 
patients' experiences as "essentially an ontological assault" 
in which the body becomes the enemy, in terposing itself 
between "us and reality," standing "opposite the self," 
(Pellegrino/Thomasma 207-208) challenging a culturally 
instilled sense of the transcendence of self over body. 
While this reorien tali on can be illuminating, more 
likely it can be alienating. Pain and illness can first effect 
alienation by counteracting "Ille human being's capacity to 
move out beyond the boundaries of his or her own body 
into the external, sharable world" (Scarry 13). Restrictive 
and dissociative, pain "chains down our thoughts," breaks 
Connections between "body" and "world." In addition to 
impeding motion beyond personal boundaries, pain also 
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alters the nature of these boundaries: "It is the intense 
pain that destroys a person's self and world, a destruction 
experienced spatially as either the contraction of the 
universe down to the immediate vicinity of Ille body or as 
the body swelling to fill the entire universe" (Scarry 35). 
The body can become one's "world" as pain occupies more 
and more of one's consciousness and crowds out awareness 
of anything else. Alienation can also be effected by 
experiencing the body as the "enemy," the "agent of the 
agony." 
Secondly, patients often experience a loss or 
usurpation of their "voice." Voice may literally be "lost" as 
a function of pain, or legitimate "voice" may be denied or 
repressed because it does not fit with normative medical or 
moral language. As Elaine Scarry notes, one characteristic 
of physical pain is that, for the most part, it is 
"inexpressible." While I can tell you of my pain, for 
example, there is no way for you to truly grasp its reality-
either that it is rea1, or how rca], how intense it is; your 
doubt of my pain cannot be decisively dispelled (4). This 
inexpressibility, this unsharability, can isolate patients from 
those close to them and prevent them from effectively 
communicating their distress to medical practitioners. 
Moreover, Scarry continues, "pain docs not simply resist 
language, but [can] actively destroy it, bringing about an 
immedjate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the 
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is 
learned" (Scarry 4). (An alternative suggestion is that these 
sounds actually are the language of pain.) It can achieve 
this effect because, physical pain resists objectification. 
Undoubtedly, this characteristic of pain underlies 
medicine's tendency to identify patients with their bodies: 
this identification is a fust step in trying to "objectity" the 
pain, to give it the referent, the object, that it lacks. As 
Arthur Frank notes, illness can also result in "the loss of 
capacity to express through the body" (Frank 85), 
But in many ways, the medical establishment furthers 
the patient's experience of loss of voice. As many have 
noted, when it comes to medicine, dIe patient is a "'stranger 
in a strange land" (Engelhardt 256); medicine is foreign 
country filled with unfamiliar languages and customs. 
Kleinman, for example, perceptively comments on how 
medical facilities seem designed to be navigated only by 
those who are familiar with Illem. Often, patients' lack of 
knowledge of the language of medicine can intimidate 
thcm, leaving them speechless. Whcn patients do "fmd" 
their voice, they often speak of the "lived experience" of 
their illness in non~scientific and often subjective 
"common-sense ways accessible to all lay persons in their 
social group" (Kleinman 4). But, all too often, in order to 
participate in the medical cure, patients must conform 
themselves to the world of medicine rather than vice versa, 
learning its language; their accounts of their own illness 
are translated into the language of the profession. 
Kleinman notes that practitioners "have been taught 
to regard with suspicion patients' illness narratives and 
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causal beliefs" (17). Physicians often feel they hav~ to sift 
oUl rneaning frorn confused and messy narrat.ves of 
palienls, listening selectively "so tha~ some aspects are 
carefully listened for and heard (somet.mes when they arc 
nOlspoken), while other things that are said-and even 
repeated-are literally not heard" (Kleinman 52, 16; Scarry 
0.7). 'Subjective' experiences of patients' illnesses become 
'objective' categorized diseases. Moreover, not only are 
patients' narratives at times suspect, but at times, as a result 
of the "inexpressibility" of their pain, patients' claims of 
illness or pain arc doubted, if not explicitly denied, 
especially in the cases of chronically ill patients or in cases 
where the ·explanatory framework" of medicine has not yet 
shifted to allow an illness into "reality." (Contemporary 
examples of U,is might include early suITerers of AIDS and 
chronic fatigue syndrome.) Alternatively, patients who 
reject a diagnosis of disease, or who do not conform to 
acceptable modes of dealing with a diagnosis, may be 
labelled as "in denial"; the physiological "interpretation" is 
given higher epistemic status than the patient's lived 
experiential interpretations. Patients, along with their 
voice" can be rendered inadequate, unhelpful, wrong, 
inactive, silenced. 
Rut, just as a crucial characteristic of suffering is its 
ability to dissolve and destroy language, a first step toward 
dis.olving and destroying suffering, then, is linguistic. As 
pain and suITering "resist objectification in language" and 
de·objectify the world, they can be only overcome by 
"forcing [them] into avenues of objectification," an 
objectification correlated with the body in which they 
reside. (Scarry 5,6, 17; sec also Soclle 7()'72) We lind this 
same notion of "objectification" in descriptions of "work." 
Work, an inextricably social process, is the vehicle through 
which we "objectify· ourselves, a multi-directional process 
through which the 'self" is constituted and through which 
the ,elf constitutes U,e "world." Dorothee Soelle employs 
U,is concept to suggest that "working on" suffering is best 
understood as "transforming the act of suffering into 
purposeful activity ... nothing [she maintains] can be 
Icamed from suffering unless it is worked through' (126). 
A fundamental shape !hat this work takes in the lives 
of U,e ill and suITering is that of creation of 'narratives.' As 
Kleinman 'noles, "the illness narrative is a story the patient 
tells, and significant o!hers retell, to give coherence to the 
di'tinctive evenls and long-term course of the suffering" 
(49). Kleinman further affirms that not only does !he story 
reflect the experience of illness, "but rather it contributes 
to the experience of symptoms and suITering" (49). Arthur 
Frank. confirms this process, noting that "in illness, the 
body finds itself progressively unable to express ilseJf in 
convenlional codes. Sometimes, with the right kind of 
support, it creates a new code" (85). 
It is noteworthy that Frank remarks, "with the right 
kind of support.· The dynamics of suffering in illness all 
contribute to a sense of isolation and marginalization 
voiced by many who have been ill. Consequently, this 
procc'ss· or~ narrative creation depends on the resources, 
-
options and opportunities offered to th~ indi\'id~al by the 
social situation. Often these prove Illsuffic.enl. BUI 
importantly, those who initiate this narrative process need 
not be the victims of suffering themselves; in fact, often 
they cannot be. Thus Kleinman includes as a "core clinical 
task" what he caUs "empathetic witnessing. That is the 
existential commitment to be with the sick person and to 
facilitate his or her building of an illness narrative that ,ill 
make sense of and give value to the experience" (54; I<e 
also Scarry 6) This corporate dimension is indispensable in 
the dissolution of suffering, for the sufferer to move [rom 
the state of isolation caused by the destruction o[ her 
world, through expression and communication 10 
solidarity through which change is possible. Thus, potential 
for deriving meaning from suffering lies not in some 
inherent quality SUffering possesses, nor in the abiliries of 
its victims. It lies rather in the resources oITered by socielJ' 
and in the willingness of individuals to participate in this 





SUFFERING AND IlLNFSS IN A LITuRGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Given the secular commitments of pluralist 
biomedical ethics described in section one, the Christian 
community might seem an unlikely place to turn to find 
resources to aid and inform our physician. But Christian 
tradition has, from its earliest beginnings, been 
significantly committed to attending those who suffer. This 
commitment has led to the development of practices which 
in their contemporary forms attend to many of the 
dynamics of suffering outlined above and thereby shape 
contemporary Christian relationships to suffering, both 
individual and communal. In this third section, I would 
like to focus on one practice in particular- liturgical rites 
of anointing and healing. For our purposes, I will draw on 
the Roman Catholic tradition's Sacrament of the Anointing 
of the Sick. 
Before turning to the Rite, it is important to highlight 
the centrality of suffering and healing in Christian practice. 
Healing the sick was one of three primary activities 
associated by the Evangelists with Jesus' ministry, 
inextricably linked with his prcaching and teaching. John 
Dominic Crossan, in a recen t article, attends to this fact 
and suggests that Jesus' particular bodily practices (i.e., 
eating and healing) embodied his message and had radical 
re1igiopolitical ramifications. Crossan locales his argument 
within the matrix of anthropological claims that correlate 
regulation of bodily boundaries with regulation of social 
boundaries. Drawing on Mary Douglas, Peter Farb and 
George Armelagos, as well as Pierre Bourdieu and Caroline 
Walker Bynum, Crossan begins with the position that in 
Jesus' Jewish culture, who one ate with defined and 
identified one's location in the social matrix: "those 
decisions about what we eat, where we eat, when we eat, 
and above all, with whom we eat ... form a miniature map of 















-" would have been rare, we can imagine, to find a Jew eating 
llt with a Samaritan or a Pharisee with a tax collector. 
,d furthermore, bodie, who were sick, menstruating or dead 
'" were denoted as ritually "unclean" and would have been 
al categorized as those one ought not touch, let alone eat 
" with. Thus, food customs and illness customs provided 
:0 clear social divisions, with some designations excluding 
II people entirely. 
" Within this matrix, Crossan argues, Jesus' 
n proclamation of the advent of the Kingdom of God 
n contained a radical social challenge. Crossan maintains 
'r that]esus' practices and message championed a radically 
o egalitarian "reciprocity of open eating and open healing" 
" (Crossan 1195). Thus we findJesus scandalizing on-lookers 
e by those he chooses to eat with (tax collectors and sinners, 
,f taking water from a Samaritan woman). Parables tell of the 
kinds of people he healed-lepers, the blind, the lame, a 
Woman "with a flow of blood "-those understood within 
the culture to be blemished or unclean. And importantly, 
in these parables it is clear thatJ esus often healed by touch, 
as Crossan notes: 
lfesusj healed the illness by refusing to accept the official 
quarantine, by refusing to stay separate from the sick person~ by 
touching him [or her], and thereby confronting others with a 
challenge and a choice. By so doing, of course, he was making 
extremely subversive claims about who defined the community, 
i\'ho patrolled its boundaries, who controlled its entries and exits, 
who, in other words, was in charge." (1197) 
Crossan implies that these two practices-open eating 
and open healing-were iden tifiable marks of what he calls 
the jesus movement." Those who had been healed were 
enjoined only to carry the message, and those who carried 
lhe message were charged to carry with them no other 
provisions but to trust that message and miracle would 
open the homes and hearths of those they healed. These 
two practices are embodied in the contemporary Church in 
the Eucharist and in the practice of ministry to the sick. 
While this is not the place to argue for a stronger liturgical 
and ecelesial understanding of the constitutive nature of 
the I~lter practice, I would like to suggest that Christian 
ItturgIeS of healing, at least as represented in the Roman 
Catholic Rite, are both responsive to the existential 
situation of those who suffer and continue to embody the 
meaning thatJesus' healing practices suggest. 
As can be seen from the text of its In troduction, the 
Rill of Anointing and Pas/fffal Care of llu Sick responds to a 
~umber of the dynamics of tlle sufferings of patients noted 
1~ part two above. First of all, the Rite is fundamentally 
Itturgical, reconfigured from its earlier privatized forms in 
Itght of the Second Vatican Council call to liturgical 
renewal. Properly liturgical actions embody and intend the 
Church as a whole, and the Introduction to the Rite 
stresses this corporate dimension: 
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like the other sacraments, these too have a communal aspect, 
which should be brought out as much as possible when they are 
celebrated .... The faithful should clearly understand the meaning 
of the anointing of the sick so that these sacraments may nourish, 
strengthen, and express faith. It is most important for the faithful 
in general, and above all for the sick, to be aided by participating 
in it, especially if it is to be carried out communally. ("Rite of 
Anointing" 191) 
The communal context of the action emphasizes that, 
overagainst the social and cultural realities of isolation and 
marginalization that attend illness, the sick are not alone. 
The ecdesial community continues to understand them as 
included, and in fact, to be an integral part of the 
community: "If one member suffers in the body of Christ, 
which is the Church, all the members suITer with him" (I 
Corinthians 12:26). ("Rite of Anointing" 190) This bond is 
reinforced in the ritual actions of touch-the laying on of 
hands and the anointing. 
In addition to communal support being integral to 
ameliorating the burdens of suffering, in part two Scarry, 
Kleinman, Soe\le and others further suggested the 
importance of "working on" or "transforming the suffering 
into purposeful activity." The Rite of Anointing of the Sick 
as a liturgical act can be understood as 'work' in precisely 
this sense. On the one hand this dimension can be seen 
etymologically, as the Greek term 'Ieitourgia' is derived 
from the two terms 'leos' (people) and 'ergou' (work). 
'Liturgy' is precisely 'work' done by all the people in the 
Body of Christ. Equally importantly, in the Rite, it is 'work' 
done by the the sick person. The sick person is not 
understood as passive and, in fact, is enjoined specia1 
duties and activities which give meaning to their sutTering: 
The sick in return offer a sign to the community: In the 
celebration of the sacrament they give witness to their promises at 
baptism to die and be buried with Christ. They tell the 
community tha~ in their present suffering they are prepared to fill 
up in their flesh what is lacking in Christ's sufferings for the 
salvation of the world ... Thc sick are assured that their suffering is 
not 'useless' but 'has meaning and value for their own salvation 
and the salvation of the world· .... And the sick are bditrl,d to be 
and seen as productive members of the community, contributing 
to the welfare of all by associating themselves freely with Christ's 
passion and death .... In the sacrament, the faith of the sick person 
gives us, the healthy, a sign-an embodiment-of the words of 
Paul to Timothy: 'You can depend on this: If we have died with 
him, we shall also live with him. Ifwe hold out to the end, we shall 
also reign with him' (2Tm 2:12). (Study Ttx~ 2().21) 
The sick are challenged not to isolate themselves 
from the community, not to withdraw in embarrassment or 
fear. They are called to continue acting as a part of the 
body of Christ, called to forge ahead in the face of their 
difficulties, modelling discipleship and sO serving as 
"minister to the whole church in their illness"(Sludy Text, 
19 
41). In Ihis way, "meaningless" suffering-of.w~ich 
surrering associated with illness is cspcciaIJy a case-Is given 
a usc, purpose, meaning. .. . 
. Finally, we nOled in part two that Illness mfhcts 
suffering partly by breaking apart a person's "code" -that 
sci of discourses, relationships, and histories by which one 
understands and inlerprets one's world and identity. The 
Rite addrcs~cs lhis in lWO ways. On the one hand, most of 
Ihose 10 whom Ihis Rile reaches inhabit 3 'code' derived 
partly from Christian formation and partly from secular 
cullure. In insL~nces of illness, especially in contemporary 
Western culture, part of the crisis of illness is created by 
presuppositions supplied by secular culture. For example, 
illne", can pose a grave threat not only to psychological 
identily but also 10 physical security in a culture that values 
10 Ihe poinl of ideology Ihe idea of individual autonomy. 
lIy. preaching and living the gospel of a God who is 
essentially dependent and self-giving, the sacramental rite 
informs those who practice it ",;th an alternative vision of 
Ihe world. 
On Ille other hand, as we noted above, Kleinman and 
olhe ... advocale th.llhose involved wilh the sick encourage 
Ihe crealion of 'narralives.' While Ihis is important, the 
Church, especially Ihrough the practice of the Rite of 
Anoinling of Ihe Sick, invites those who suffer to locate 
their narratives in an ongoing story, tolearn anew the 
slories of others who have suffered and the interpretations 
they gave Il,eir experiences, to truly hear-possibly for Ille 
first lime-what it means to worship a God whose 
rclationshlp to humanity was revealed on a cross. 
SACRAlIIENTS AND MEDICAL ETHlCS? 
II might be objected Illat all this is well and good, but 
il doesn't really aid us in Il,e difficult task of making day-to-
day decisions aboul which technologies to usc, and when, 
and for how long. But the power of the simple dynamic 
iuvoh'cd in these liturgical riles is easy to underestimate 
when compared to the power exercised by biomedical 
technologies and interventions. Like Jesus' practices of 
open eating and open healing, Christian understandings of 
suffering, illness and healing embodied in the riles and 
lit'urgies of common worship challenge contemporary 
cultural understandings. The Church's 'discourses' 
cha llenge those of secular society. They refuse to locate a 
creature's\-aluc solely in its rationality, refusing to accept 
Ihedesignation 'enemy' for the realilies of suffering and 
dcalh~ refusing to validate 3. posture that is closed to the 
world and fearful and ostracizing of UlDse who are 'olller.' 
Those physicians and patients formed by ccclesial 
praclices of Christian communities will find themselves 
. , na,'igatingthe world of medicine and biomedical ethics 
along a ' different path, for what they sec as 'persons,' 
'thieats,' 'dilemmas,' and even 'the world' may differ 
i signficantly from their colleagues. For the ph}~ician whose 
. Slo'ry opened these renections, the Sacrament of the 
. , 
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Anointing of the Sick might have supplied him with Eng' 
alternative understandings of sufferings and a dispmition ( 
toward openness and vulnerability that would have enabled FI" 
him to reach out to the patient with a touch that healed. As I 
importantly, it might have opened him to the touch of the I 
patient that would have lefl him with the hopeful memo!), finl 
of shared community in addition to the empty sorrow of 
aloneness. 0 CUI 
Notes 197 
1 I would assert the case for three approaches to biomcdiCiI 
ethics: (I) pluralist-represented by Engelhard~ and the work 01 lie 
Beauchamp and Childres. in Principles; (2) an ethics 01 
medicine-represented by Leon !\ass, as well as Pellegrino and Kl' 
Thomasma in It Phiwsophical Basis; and (3) Roman Catholic 
biomedical ethics--represenlcd by Richard A. McCormick,5J. II, 
Lisa Sowle Cahill and Charles E. Curran. 
2Jt is important to emphasize here that I am distinguishing 
between medical ethics and medicine. Clearly medicine attends to ~, 
bodies and the bodily in a significant manner, both conceptu~~ 
and practically. My remarks are directed solely at medical ethia 
at this point- p, 
30n the other hand, I do not distinguish too clearly between the 
notions of 'suffering' and 'pain: The distincLion, which is 
commonly employed. re lates suffering to one's self and identity, 
while pain is understood primarily in bodily terms. Although it il 
now rather standard to make this distinction, and the distinction 
can be helpful within certain arguments, I would resist ma};.ing it 
loo clear~cut . as I am concerned thal it might buy intO a 
mind/body dualism that will only exacerbaU! the problems I . '11 
trying to address. 
Work. Cited 
Beauchamp, Tom and James Childress. PrincipIIs of Bi"""di,,1 
Ethics, 2nd edition . New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Bourdieu. Pierre. An Outline of a Theory of Practice. New Yor~·. 
Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
Bynum, Caroline Walker. Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Rtlir"" 
Significance o/Food 10 Medieval Women. Berkeley: The Uni\"eni~' 
of Cali fomi a Press. 1987. 
Cahill, Lisa Sowle. ·Can Theology Have a Role in 'PubliC' 
Bioethical Discourse?" Hastings Center &port 20.4 A Special 
Supplemen~July/Augusc 1-11, 1990. 
Campbell, Courtney. "Religion and Moral Meaning in Bioethic' 
Hasting> Center Rrfxm 20.4 A Special Supplement, July! Aug"" 
4-10,1990. 
Cassell, Eric. "Recognizing Suffering," Hastings Center JUpor1 11 
May-June 1991 : 24-31. 
Crossan. John Dominic. '"The Life of a Mediterranean Je""ish 
Peasant.' The Christian Century 108 December 18-25, 199t: 
1194-1200. 
Elshtain, Jean-Bethke. Public Man, Privott Woman. PrincelOn, )(J 


























£ngelhard~ H, Tristram,Jr. The Foundntion of Bio,thies. New York: 
Oxford,1986. 
Fflnk, Arthur. "For a Sociology of the Body: An Analytical 
Review," in TM Body# Mike Featherstone, Mike Hepworth and 
Bryan Turner, eds. London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1991. 
Fink.elstein, Joanne L. "Biomedicine and Technocratic Power." 
HaslingsCm/n"&porl20A July/August: 13-16,1990. 
Gunderman, Richard B. "Medicine and the Question of 
Suffering." s.cond opinion 14: 15-25, 1990. 
1979, "Rite of Anointing and Pastoral Care of the Sick." Instruction 
on tht Rruistd lWman Rjl~s. London: Collins. 
Heller, Agnes. Ev..,day Lif'. Tr. C.L. Campbell. Now York: 
Roulledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. 
Kleinman, Arthur, M.D. The l/lness Narratives: Suffering, Healing 
and the Human Condition. New York: Basic Books, inc., 1988 . 
IlcGill, Arthur C. Suffering: A Test of Theological Method. 
Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1982. 
llusser, Donald M., 1987. ·On the Edge of Uncertainty: Twenty 
Years with Cancer," Suond Opinion 5: 121-127, 1982. 
~,tional Council of Catholic Bishops. Study Text 2: Pastoral Care of 
I'" Sic. and Dying. Washington, D.C.: Office of Publishing 
Services! United States Catho1ic Conference, 1981. 
Pellegrino, Edmund and David Thomasma. A Philosophical Basis of 
Medical Practice: Toward a Philosophy and Ethic of the H,aling 
Profession. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. 
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of /he 
World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Smith, David H. "suffering, Medicine, and Christian Theology," 
in On Moral Medicine: ThLolog':cal PtTSpectives in Medical Ethics . 
Stephen E. Lammers and Allen Verhey, eds. Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987. 
Soelle, Dorothee. Suffering. Tr. Everett R. Kalin. Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1975. 
Springstead. Eric. Simone Weil and The Suffering of Love. 
Cambridge, MA: Cowley Publications, 1985. 
Turner, Bryan. The Body and Society: Exp/Qrations in Social Theory. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 
Turner, Bryan. Medical Power and Social Kncw/dfj'. London: Sage 
Publications, 1987. 
Weil, Simone. Waiting on God. 
Wendell. Susan. "Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability." Hypatia 
4.2 (Summer): 101-124,1989. 
Wind, James P. "'What Can Religion Offer Bioethics." Hastings 
Center &port 20.4 A Special Supplement, July/August: 11>-20, 
1990. 
21 
